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Abstract: 
Of the limitations and possibilities raised by Frosh and Baraitser’s discussion of psychoanalysis and 
psychosocial studies, three themes are particularly deserving of further attention. The first concerns the 
epistemological and ethical break that divides psychoanalysis’ clinical praxis from its role as a means of 
qualitative or interview methodology. A second deals with the status of psychoanalytic discourse as a 
touchstone of authority, as a ‘master’s discourse’. Debating such problems opens up two possible  
routes of methodological enquiry: the potential of using psychoanalysis, following Parker (2008), as a 
means of subverting effects of mastery, individuality and truth, and the idea of focusing on libidinal 
economy rather than on individual subjects when it comes to combining textual and psychoanalytic 
forms of analysis. The paper closes by discussing the notion of a trans-individual unconscious, 
proposing that psychoanalysis and psychosocial studies might find some common ground with 
reference to the Lacanian idea of the unconscious as the subjective locus of the Other. 
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Articulating psychoanalysis and psychosocial studies: Limitations and possibilities  
Derek Hook 
 
Introduction 
 
Frosh and Baraitser identify at least three prospective impasses in their astute observations regarding 
the hope of articulating psychoanalysis and psychosocial studies. The first of these concerns the 
epistemological and ethical break that divides psychoanalysis’ clinical praxis from its role as a means of 
qualitative or interview methodology. A second point of conflict concerns the status of psychoanalytic 
discourse as a touchstone of authority and knowledge, as - ironically enough for a theory of the 
subversion of rationality - a mode of certainty, a ‘master’s discourse’. The discussion of such problems 
opens up two possible routes of methodological enquiry: the potential of using psychoanalysis, 
following Parker (2008), to subvert effects of mastery, individuality and truth, and the idea of focusing 
on libidinal economy rather than on individual subjects when it comes to combining textual and 
psychoanalytic forms of analysis. A third impasse involves discussion over a workable notion of the 
unconscious that may viably link psychosocial and psychoanalytic studies. I will begin with the first of 
these themes – the disjunction between the clinic and the realm of qualitative research - because it 
represents an issue where I am in complete agreement with Frosh and Baraitser.  
 
Overstretching the clinic 
 
Frosh and Baraitser do well to point out the difficulties inherent in the attempt to replicate the clinical 
technology of psychoanalysis in non-clinical environments. There is no doubt that psychoanalysis 
brings a distinctive conceptual frame and a powerful distancing procedure - indeed, a potentially 
subversive reading and listening ‘methodology’ - to the work of critique. One need remain vigilant, 
however, toward the epistemological and ethical disjunction that accompanies attempts to apply 
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psychoanalysis’ clinical forms beyond the confines of the clinic. The case of ostensibly ‘expert’ 
psychoanalytic interpretations made of others (colleagues, research participants, etc.), from the position 
of implicit mastery (as in the case of published commentary), makes for a case in point. 
I would argue that not even the position of analyst within the clinical frame automatically 
warrants a complete interpretative latitude. We know that for Freud, despite the dazzling interpretative 
displays in his written work, a dream interpretation can only be definitive, ‘authorized’, by the dreamers 
themselves. The Lacanian procedure of enigmatic, oracular interpretative interventions – which often 
take the form of question-posing performative gestures rather than actual comments – likewise flies in 
the face of a clinician’s prerogative to offer definitive interpretations. If one accepts that sense-making 
and understanding often function - much like the apparent illuminations of interpretation itself - as 
means of defence, as easy forms of closure or resolution, then we appreciate how such processes undo 
analytical work which should precisely take us further and further into unknowing.  
We might admit that psychoanalytic interpretation remains always poised on the verge of wild 
analysis. This, it would seem, is the inherent epistemic risk posed by a discipline that hopes to trace the 
unconscious in its most unlikely and absurd manifestations. If this is indeed the case, then the factors of 
supervision, clinical technique, the provision of an appropriate ethical code, and the contextualization of 
a detailed and ongoing (week-by-week, year-by-year) life-history – that is, precisely those factors 
which in part define the clinic – are all of absolute necessity. It is thus difficult to see how one can 
justifiably extend clinical psychoanalytic warrants (such as diagnosis and interpretation of individuals) 
beyond the parameters of the clinic. 
 
Libidinal economy  
 
The non-generalizability of psychoanalytic clinical intervention beyond the clinic does not suggest that 
we have reached a dead-end with regard to how psychoanalytic procedures might be linked to textual 
analytic work. To the contrary, I believe there are at least two under-explored strategies deserving of 
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further attention in this respect. The first concerns the move, evident in instances of postcolonial 
criticism, to employ the vocabulary of psychoanalytic description to apprehend certain systematic 
patterns and operations occurring within a given discursive formation. Rather than settling on individual 
subjects and their particular diagnostics or dynamics, such an analytic targets the libidinal economy of a 
given discourse. Such an approach, referring back to Freud’s (1921) libidinal economy of the mass in 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, remains irreducibly social in its focus. Libidinal 
economy is a fundamental vector of group identification: the push-pull cohesion of its ego-ideal and 
ideal-ego dynamics is precisely what for Freud proved constitutive of social bonds. It would seem in 
this respect that the proposed articulation between psychoanalysis and discourse/textual analysis (or 
psychosocial studies more generally) might profit more from the approach of Freud’s group psychology 
than from his clinical procedures.  
The analysis of the libidinal economy underlying specific discursive formations would move us 
away from the attempt to grasp the unconscious of any individual subject. It proposes a non-reductive 
analytical strategy, asserting that discourses themselves maintain the coherence, the repetitiveness - 
indeed, the cycles of jouissance - that mark certain well-established patterns of libidinal functioning, a 
strategy which does not attempt to fix such discursive patterns as merely the outcome of intra-psychic 
processes, of individual psychopathology. The colonial stereotype, for Bhabha (2004), for example, is 
seen to accord, in all its insistence, its defensiveness and precariousness, with the libidinal economy of 
fetishism. Similarly, in Fanon (1967) we find an argument according to which the ambivalent 
vacillations of racist discourse might be usefully analyzed along the lines of the libidinal economy of 
phobia. Coetzee (1991), furthermore, has examined how facets of apartheid ideology – ideology at the 
level of community and nation - might productively be understood as exemplifying the libidinal 
patterns of obsessionality, along with its associated strategies of fantasy and metonymic displacement, 
enabling thus an understanding of the longevity of apartheid’s ‘malaise of reason’.  
It is not difficult to see how certain psychoanalytic concepts usefully inform such an approach. 
The assumption here is, to give an example, that the effective functioning of any discursive formation 
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necessarily entails particular master-signifiers (or ‘empty signifiers’ to use Laclau’s (1996) term), that 
is, nodal-points in the discourse which can never be definitely fixed or exhausted. These nodal points 
remain somehow open, but they anchor meaning (as in the case of appeals to ‘Science’, 
‘psychoanalysis’, ‘Truth’ etc.) and organize the ideological field. In much the same vein, one might 
attempt to identify certain sublime or privileged objects, fantasmatic object-causes of desire, points 
around which a discourse pivots. I have in mind here the role of certain precious (objet petit a) objects, 
which contain a je ne sais quoi quality, something ‘in them more than themselves’, and hence take on a 
disproportionate libidinal status by virtue of the degree of investment of a given community. Similarly, 
one might identify the defensive procedures of a discourse, questioning how it operates a particular 
modality of negation following on from the Freudian intuition that different forms of negation can be 
linked to distinctive libidinal patterns: repression in the case of neurosis, disavowal in the case of 
perversion, foreclosure in the case of psychosis. Paul Gilroy’s (2004) analysis of contemporary 
Britishness, for example, reveals a dynamics of selective aggrandizement and amnesia, an awkward 
juxtaposition of a repressed colonial past existing alongside imperatives to rejuvenate a vision of British 
greatness. The resulting cultural conjunction, he concludes, is one that exhibits all the patterns of 
neurotic blockage, repetition and ambivalence, particularly in view of its attempted adjustment to the 
challenges of multicultural society. 
 Apprehending the libidinal economy of given discourses might enable us to answer questions 
along the lines of why certain signifiers come to be locked into patterns of repetition; why some are 
particularly historically-persistent, ‘sticky’, difficult to shake; why others are so volatile and anxious, 
short-circuiting reason to attain more immediately affective responses. It may likewise assist us in 
understanding why still other signifiers are so quickly dissipated, failing to gain the investment, the 
‘volume’, the affective hegemony of those more effectively enjoyed by a given community. 
 
Psychoanalytic procedure against psychoanalysis  
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A second possibility regarding the use of psychoanalytic methodology for qualitative research can be 
read out of Parker’s (2008) Lacanian application of psychoanalysis against psychoanalysis, that is, his 
elaboration of Lacan’s (2007) injunctions against the multiple lures of mastery, individuality and truth 
which stem from treating psychoanalysis as an idealized from of knowledge. There are moments in 
such an application of psychoanalysis, in the investigation of particular discursive structures (of the 
master, the university, the hysteric, the analytic), where an ostensibly Lacanian engagement feels 
Foucauldian, certainly so inasmuch as it pertains to particular historical situations, locates specific 
structural speaking-positions of dominance and proves able to pin-point both what is effectively 
produced and barred by such discursive structures or social ties (Lacan, 2007; Žižek, 2004). 
 Parker, like Frosh and Baraitser, is alive to the particular discursive capital that comes with 
speaking from the position of psychoanalytic mastery. This is a longstanding issue: how psychoanalysis 
works within culture as a ‘trump discourse’ able to authorize particular discursive warrants 
(interpretation, the prerogative to discern the unconscious dimension of everyday explanations), 
exclusions (merely rational forms of knowledge as superficial) and truth-effects (its constructions of the 
deep truths of human subjectivity). Who in this respect can forget Foucault’s (1977) analysis of the psy-
disciplines as possessed of an implicit moral force, and of psychoanalysis in particular (1978) as, in 
Frosh and Baraitser’s words, “an expert system that has access to [an] inner world and knows what it is 
like, and posits it as something that exists in and of itself”? In response to this, one can only evoke 
Parker’s (2008) Lacanian insistence that psychoanalytic procedures should be applied precisely against 
the discursive effects of truth, mastery, individuality, that such subversive reading strategies be opposed 
to the formation and/or productions of any master’s discourse, even if that discourse is psychoanalysis 
itself. 
 Frosh and Baraitser make a parallel move to Parker’s in calling upon reflexivity as a means of 
destabilizing such hegemonic formations within the aspirant ‘trans-disciplinarity’ of psychosocial 
studies. There is a faint equivocation here: reflexivity is first evoked as a means of subversion, as a 
safeguard of criticality; as their argument progresses, however, the claim to reflexivity is itself 
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scrutinized as an inadequate mark of critical distance. With the latter argument I can only agree: 
inasmuch as reflexivity involves a type of ego-judgement on its own productions, it cannot but be part 
of the problem, a means of insulating the méconnaissance of ego-misrecognition within a closed-
circuit. Neither the perspective I have on my own perspective, nor my co-researcher’s input on my own 
input, entails an adequate degree of otherness; for reflexivity to work, a far more radical break, a more 
forceful discontinuity needs to be introduced. I agree with Frosh and Baraitser that psychoanalysis 
precisely as a procedure for not understanding, as means of pinpointing what is Other in my own 
commonplace constructions, holds some promise here. Psychoanalysis however is not our only answer: 
for Foucault such a generation of discontinuity typically takes the genealogical form of neglected 
histories; for cultural and social theory this often takes the form of an unceasing exploration of different 
theoretical languages, registers of engagement, modes of critique. 
 
 
The trans-individual unconscious 
 
This discussion of disjunction, discontinuity and Otherness leads us into the topic of the unconscious, 
and of what version thereof might suit both psychoanalysis and psychosocial studies. There is an 
interesting footnote toward the end of one of Slavoj Žižek’s (1994) essays on ideology in which he 
insists that 
 
…the concept of the unconscious is to be conceived in the strictly Freudian sense, as ‘trans-
individual’ – that is, beyond the ideological opposition of ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ 
unconscious: the subject’s unconscious is always grounded in the transferential relationship 
towards the Other; it is always ‘external’ with regard to the subject’s monadic existence. 
(1994, p 33) 
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Chiesa (2007) likewise draws attention to the idea of a trans-individual unconscious which can be 
collapsed neither into intrasubjectivity (the unconscious as “the Other within me”) nor into 
intersubjectivity (the unconscious as the Other subject): 
 
The idea of an “individual” unconscious – on which both intra- and intersubjective 
accounts of the unconscious are based makes sense only if the Symbolic [the realm of law, 
language, socio-symbolic functioning] is associated with the Imaginary [the ego-domain of 
idealizing identifications and rivalry]. More importantly, we should emphasize . . . [the] 
unconscious understood as the universal, nonindividuated Other of language 
(which…relies on the linguistic notion of the signifier and the structural laws that govern 
it)… [W]hat appears – from an imaginary standpoint – to be the “individual” unconscious 
of one given subject cannot be dissociated from language as such. It is in this sense that the 
unconscious is at times said to lie “outside” the subject . . . Lacan’s transindividual 
unconscious . . . [thus] corresponds to a symbolic signifying structure. (Chiesa, 2007, pp 
43-44).  
 
Grasping such a trans-individual notion of the unconscious is an imperative for the further articulation 
of psychoanalysis and psychosocial studies. It would enable us better to comprehend the failure and 
disruption, the very lack of self-transparency that proves constitutive of the subject’s emergence as an 
enunciating subject of desire. Any instance of meaning-making, of discourse in operation, brings with it 
such impediments, such un-intentions and ambiguities simply by virtue of the fact that they are played 
out in a social field in which statement and enunciation, intended meaning and performative utterance, 
are never one and the same.  
Without some acknowledgement of this dimension of rupture and discontinuity, of the ‘over-
intention’ of desire at work within language, we would seem necessarily to come up short in our 
attempts to apprehend the functioning of discourse and subjectivity alike. A properly trans-individual 
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notion of the unconscious is one which in many ways seems commensurate with discursive, or broadly 
‘post-structural’ approaches that emphasize the role of social structure and the conditions under which 
‘the subject is spoken’. This is unconscious as signifying structure, as operation (as in Freud’s 
dreamwork) of condensation and displacement, an unconscious, put bluntly, evidenced only in the 
operation of the signifier.  
Within such a trans-individual conceptualization the unconscious cannot be understood as 
merely an intra-psychic function; it needs to be apprehended as the outcome of the structural constraints 
within which the social act of speaking or making discourse must occur. Such a non-psychological 
perspective on the unconscious targets the functioning of the signifier and the structure of language, 
jettisoning notions of depth, internality and hidden primal/repressed contents in accordance with Frosh 
and Baraitser’s characterization of “not down and deep…but out and wide”. The unconscious in this 
respect is, to quote the well-known Lacanian dictum, ‘the discourse of the Other’, a designation 
emphasizing that the unconscious must always be approached in relation to the trans-subjective social 
order of the big Other. Seshadri-Crooks (2000) makes this argument to great effect: the unconscious 
must not be grasped as a subterranean space opposed to consciousness, as an inchoate, swirling mass of 
repressed contents, but rather as the subjective locus of the Other or the symbolic order.  
Seshandri-Crooks surveys a series of Lacan’s postulates on the unconscious to draw the 
following conclusions: the unconscious is not a primal, archaic function; it is not a set of unorganized 
drives or repressed contents; it should not be viewed as a collection of an individual’s prohibited 
memories and desires. She (2000) points to Lacan’s crucial qualification of Freudian doctrine, namely 
the idea that it is not affects that are repressed, but the ideational representatives of affects, which 
Lacan understands within the rubric of the signifier. Hence Lacan’s procedural focus on the 
unconscious as occurring within the actions of speech, the idea that the Lacanian unconscious precisely 
is the processes of signification beyond the control of the speaking subject. This is an external rather 
than internal unconsciousness, activated in the operations and performances of language, in the 
subject’s grappling with their place - relative to the Other’s desire - in the symbolic order.  
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I have tried elsewhere (2008) to develop the transferential dimension emphasized by the above 
Žižek quote, to expand upon the fact of an ongoing ‘fantasmatic transaction’ whereby subjects are 
constantly preoccupied with the task of fathoming their place in the social order via the ‘Che vuoi?’ 
formula repetitively posed to the big Other (“What do you want?”, “What am I to you?”, “What must I 
be?”). Žižek has done much to drive home the point that this alienating pattern of questioning - in 
which the subject is continually overridden, ‘determined’ by the operation of the signifier - occurs 
everywhere in the political domain. This is where I will end, by posing an agenda that I take to be of 
primary importance in thinking psychoanalysis and psychosocial studies together: the need to connect 
questions of a trans-individual unconscious - and indeed, of libidinal economy - to theoretical, 
discursive and empirical analyses of how power and ideology function in the public realm today. 
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